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ABSTRACT  
The proliferation of mobile communication and computing devices, in particular smart mobile 
phones, is almost paralleled with the increasing number of mobile device forensics tools in the 
market. Each mobile forensics tool vendor, on one hand claims to have a tool that is best in 
terms of performance, while on the other hand each tool vendor seems to be using different 
standards for testing their tools and thereby defining what support means differently. To 
overcome this problem, a testing framework based on a series of tests ranging from basic 
forensics tasks such as file system reconstruction up to more complex ones countering anti-
forensic techniques is proposed. The framework, which is an extension of an existing effort done 
in 2010, prescribes a method to clearly circumscribe the term support into precise levels. It also 
gives an idea of the standard to be developed and accepted by the forensic community that will 
make it easier for forensics investigators to quickly select the most appropriate tool for a 
particular mobile device.  
Keywords: mobile device forensics, digital forensics, forensics tool testing, forensics tool 
evaluation, testing framework, support profiles 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
The number of mobile devices (MD) is 
increasing (Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007), 
as well as the ways they are being used in our 
everyday professional and private activities. 
This is evidenced, for example, through the 
immense growth of cellular subscriptions 
(which is expected to reach almost seven 
billion by the end of 2014 (International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2014) and 
the volume of SMS exchanged that was close 
to 6.1 trillion in 2010 (International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2010). 
Butler also stated that, 41% of the population 
uses the embedded digital cameras in their 
mobile phones, while 13%, 10% and 21% use 
them for internet access, radio access and 
mini games respectively (Butler, 2010).  
Modalities of how mobile devices are being 
used range from simple voice calls, 
audio/video conferencing, emails, short 
messages, social networking media, chatting, 
internet browsing, GPS navigation, pictures, 
videos, and standalone application. MDs are a 
very good source of information regarding 
various activities of their users and thus serve 
as some kind of digital behavioral archives 
(Gonzalez, Hung, & Friedberg, 2011). The 
artifacts thus produced potentially create a 
wealth of digital evidence possibly highly 
relevant to different law-enforcement 
organizations and legal institutions (such as 
criminal and civil court cases) (Butler, 2010). 
Numerous criminal offenders have been 
convicted partly due to the evidence from 
either their mobile phones and/or those of 
their respective victims. In fact, more than 
80% of court cases in US have some form of 
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digital evidence linked to them (Baggili et al., 
2007; Butler, 2010).  Consequently, the need 
and the demand for tools that are capable of 
extracting, archiving, reconstructing, 
analyzing and presenting digital evidence 
(termed as mobile device forensics tools or 
MDFT) is on the rise. Most often two or more 
tools are used to extract data from mobile 
devices (for instance  smart phones) to 
validate the results and to ensure that not a 
single piece of information has been missed or 
lost (Armstrong, 2003; Butler, 2010).  
That is why, (Jansen, Delaitre, & 
Moenner, 2008) assert that these tools should 
be reliable enough to provide valid results, 
which can be admissible in the court of law. 
In the course of this research, the term 
validity refers to the ability of the tool to 
identify, extract and reconstruct a digital 
object in the same state as the MD user was 
presented with. This includes the 
reconstruction of the binary content of the file 
(even if fragmented) and the ability to 
represent any file objects with the 
corresponding metadata via its ‘natural’ 
application.  
In addition, (Ahmed & Dharaskar, 2008) 
elaborate that digital evidence is a necessity 
as users now use their mobile phones to store 
almost any kind of information about 
themselves, which underlines the requirements 
that MDFTs have to extract electronic 
evidence without altering any data (Al-
Zarouni, 2006). This can be done only by 
tools that fully support a particular function 
in the extraction process, hence no mobile 
forensic tool can claim to fully support any 
particular phone (MSAB Blog, 2011). Their 
compatibility and abilities should be explicitly 
stated to help an investigator in the selection 
of an appropriate tool. 
The engineering behind the commercial 
MDFTs is usually proprietary and not clear to 
the investigators. On the other side, the open 
source tools are not documented properly and 
they undergo constant changes with respect to 
their design and functionalities (Baggili et al., 
2007). Since the role of MDFT in digital 
investigations is crucial and potentially 
definitive in deciding the outcome of legal 
cases, investigators need to be assured in the 
accuracy of the tools or their potential error 
rates, which qualifies the extent of support to 
mobile devices and eventually its 
quantification (Baggili et al., 2007; MSAB 
Blog, 2011). 
Currently, the only framework available is 
from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (Baggili et al., 2007; 
National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), 2010a, 2010b), which is 
being used as a set of recommendations rather 
than a standard for MDFT testing (Baggili et 
al., 2007). The framework was defined in 
2010, and it is obvious that in the meantime 
mobile devices have evolved a lot so 
modification and extension to the 
specifications and associated test plans are 
truly needed.  
The tools should produce valid results 
based on what is really needed in terms of 
data objects that are admissible in the court 
of law (Jansen et al., 2008). Most of the 
investigators face a great challenge of 
selecting the appropriate tool capable of 
producing a forensically sound evidence 
(Kubi, Saleem, & Popov, 2011; Saleem, 
Popov, & Baggili, 2014; Saleem, Popov, & 
Kubi, 2013; Saleem & Popov, 2013). 
Therefore, we need a standardized tool testing 
framework for MDFTs. 
1.1 Research Problem 
Due to the lack of any standards, each tool 
vendor defines the term ‘support’ differently. 
This creates enormous and challenging 
difficulties for an investigator to know and 
understand what each tool vendor means by 
the term ‘supported’. Most of the forensic tool 
vendors claim to support the highest number 
of phones, which has become the central focus 
rather than the quality (for instance the 
capability and the  accuracy) of the respective 
tool (Curran, Robinson, Peacocke, & Cassidy, 
2010; MSAB Blog, 2011). These mobile 
forensic tools are important to law 
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enforcement agencies in solving criminal 
investigations. However, if the results 
produced by these tools are incorrect or the 
tool does not perform well for the important 
types of evidence in a specific case then the 
results might be deemed inadmissible in the 
court of law (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
Once a tool vendor claims support for a 
phone, the term support should be qualified. 
Sometimes extraction of call logs and text 
messages alone is enough for an MD to be 
included into the list of supported MDs. This 
means that the term support is ambiguous 
and subjective as it does not reflect the real 
level of support a tool has for a specified MD. 
Hence, each tool has its own capabilities 
required to be bench marked (Ahmed & 
Dharaskar, 2008; MSAB Blog, 2011). 
The evolution in MDs capabilities, ranging 
from battery life, memory, processing power, 
and the changes in the computing and 
communications paradigms through 
virtualization, cloud computing, distributed 
network storage, combined with useful 
spectrum of applications has transformed 
them into rather powerful computing and 
communications devices. The level of 
configuration and personalization in the MDs 
is also on the rise. Modern MDs are very 
flexible and provide interfaces for various 
tasks which have also opened possibilities to 
easily exploit anti-forensics techniques. The 
user of an older MD (for example Nokia 3310) 
cannot change for instance the default 
location settings of data objects generated as 
a consequence of the normal usage of the 
device. However with the new smartphones, 
the user can manipulate these default location 
settings or even install other third party 
applications to change the contents of the 
corresponding data objects.  
Text messages can be a good example to 
understand the complexities being 
encountered by the forensics tools. These 
messages are now not only generated by the 
native application in SMS format but also by 
many third party apps (for example 
Handcent, Viber, Whatsapp, Twitter, Skype 
and Hangout). Every application provides 
different levels of customization and operates 
on different standards and formats to work 
with the corresponding data objects. In order 
to answer these questions, a framework is 
proposed to check the quality of data 
extracted by a mobile forensic tool with 
emphasis on anti-forensic techniques and to 
quantify the term “supported” in the context 
of a MDFT. 
1.2 Related Work 
NIST has evaluated some MDFTs against 
their specifications and published the results 
(National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), 2013). NIST 
specifications (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), 2010a) have six core 
and fifteen optional requirements. In addition, 
the work has proposed a tool testing plan 
(National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), 2010b) based on these 
specifications (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), 2010a). The plan has 
thirty two (32) compulsory assertions and 
forty four (44) optional assertions. NIST has 
defined the following twenty (20) profiles by 
using different combinations of these seventy 
six (76) assertions.  
1. Connectivity (between the tool and 
the MD) 
2. Data Acquisition and Interpretation 
a. Presentation 
b. Subscriber and Equipment 
Related Data 
c. Personal Information 
Management (PIM) Data 
d. Call Logs 
e. Text Messages (SMS, EMS, 
MMS) 
f. Stand-alone Multi-media Data 
g. Application Data 
h. Internet Related Data 
3. Location Related Data 
4. Tool Acquisition Variations  
5. Device Data Not Modified  
6. Generated Reports / Preview-Pane 
7. Case File/Data Protection 
JDFSL V9N2 Testing Framework for Mobile Device … 
Page 224  © 2014 ADFSL 
8. SIM PIN/PUK Authentication  
9. Physical Acquisition 
10. Non-ASCII Character Presentation 
11. Stand-alone Acquisition  
12. Hashing 
13. GPS Reporting 
Similarly some formal techniques were also 
presented (Kubi et al., 2011; Saleem et al., 
2014, 2013; Saleem & Popov, 2013) to help 
select the most appropriate tool. All of them 
relied on the specifications by NIST that were 
defined in 2010. One of the obvious problems 
associated with NIST specification is that, 
MDs (since 2010) have gone through so many 
changes that a revision and enrichment to 
these specifications and corresponding test 
plans is required. 
The remaining sections of this paper 
explain the terms being used in the 
introduction, the extension to the NIST 
testing plan and its evaluation using two 
MDFTs. Discussion on the standard used to 
quantify the term “support” for all the twenty 
profiles is followed by a concluding section 
that includes a discussion on the framework, 
its application, the test results and the 
direction of future research in this domain. 
2.  MOBILE DEVICE 
FORENSICS 
Mobile Device Forensics (MoDeFo) is a 
branch of digital forensics where the main 
goal is the retrieval of data or evidence from 
MDs and similar devices (Bhadsavle & Wang, 
2009). MoDeFo is based on  proven scientific 
methodologies to collect facts regarding an 
object, an artifact, or an event in a specific 
time frame in order to determine if the object 
under consideration claims to be or is just 
alleges its existence (Casey, 2009).  
As posited earlier, MDs have become 
dynamic mobile computing platforms due to 
the constant upgrades, changes and new 
additions. The lack of forensic tools that will 
be able to retrieve data and thereby be 
compatible with the continuous surge  of new  
mobile device models is a problem being faced 
by the experts in MoDeFo (Bhadsavle & 
Wang, 2009). 
2.1 Sources of Evidence 
Gonzalez et al. (2011) outlined major types of 
evidence that can be obtained from MDs. 
These include call logs, SMS, contacts, 
calendar, memos, multimedia items, notes, 
videos, maps, internet browsing history, 
screenshots, voicemails, wireless network data 
etc. They also explain some of the challenges 
that arise when it comes to MoDeFo and the 
potential outcomes from an investigation.  
For instance, Curran et al. (2010) state 
that, the most viable evidence that gives a 
clear cut between traditional computers and 
mobile phones is the location data. The hint 
about the specific location of the person at the 
time of an incident is important for numerous 
investigations. This important piece of 
location data may be obtained from various 
sources of the MDs (Gonzalez et al., 2011). 
2.2 Mobile Device Forensics Tools 
MDFTs are the main tools aside 
synchronization software, which are used in 
the extraction of data from MDs (Jansen et 
al., 2008). In fact, they form an interface with 
which the examiner can connect to the MD to 
view,  extract or examine its contents 
(Williamson & Apeldoorn, 2005). For 
extracted data to be admissible in the court of 
law, a forensic expert should be able to show 
that the data is forensically sound which 
means that it has not been tampered with 
during the entire investigation process (Casey, 
2009). Two MDFTs were selected to test the 
proposed framework. Their names are kept 
confidential and hence are denoted by the 
variables “U” and “X”. 
2.3 Extraction Methods 
Manual extraction, logical extraction and 
physical extraction are the three main 
methods used to extract data from MDs. We 
used logical and physical extraction and a 
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brief introduction of these methods is given 
below. 
2.3.1   Manual Extraction 
In this type of extraction the examiners go 
through the documentation of an MD and 
manually access and record information on 
the screen (Brothers, 2007; Casey, 2011). 
Documentation is done to preserve the chain 
of custody and to ensure that every detail is 
well captured/recorded. In this case, data 
which is accessible through the operating 
system is retrieved and captured either by 
photographing or videotaping (Casey, 2011). 
Physically damaged phone is a problem with 
this type of extraction such as the case when 
the keys fail to respond and the screen has 
cracks or it is damaged (Brothers, 2007). 
2.3.2   Logical Extraction 
In logical extraction, a connection is 
established between the mobile devices and 
the computer of the examiner via Bluetooth, 
cable or infra-red interface using protocols 
such as OBEX, BREW, AT commands and 
F-BUS. Only data which is accessible through 
the operating system is extracted and 
communication works only through a  
client/server mode (Brothers, 2007; Casey, 
2011). 
Disabled data port is a major problem 
with this type of extraction (Brothers, 2007). 
If a phone has a security code enabled and the 
modem mode disabled then the phone needs 
to be set to modem mode before logical 
extraction can proceed (due to the need for 
inter device communication). Moreover, if the 
phone is locked and the modem port is also 
disabled then it becomes difficult to do 
extraction and one may need to resort to a 
manual extraction. 
2.3.3   Physical Extraction 
Physical extraction deals with mining of the 
entire memory content through 
communication ports. It is accomplished by 
using a boot loader or an unsigned code which 
is pushed into the memory of the mobile 
phone. The data that is pushed out through 
the communication conduit is stored in a raw 
HEX or binary format. The interpretation of 
the binary data is dependent on how the data 
is stored in the memory of the phone. An 
example of the interfaces used in this type of 
extraction is the JTAG interface. It allows a 
complete extraction of the memory. Many of 
the mobile forensic tool vendors have begun 
to support more phones in this type of 
extraction over the last couple of years. 
(Brothers, 2007; Casey, 2011)  
This type of extraction is time consuming 
and the output is difficult to analyze. Dumped 
and decoded data cannot be easily compared 
to what is seen on the interface of the MD. 
2.4 Anti Forensics 
For long, criminals have used anti-forensics 
techniques to thwart evidence on weapons or 
other artifacts they have used in a crime scene 
and thus misleading investigators to make 
wrong conclusions (Ispirian, 2013). Wearing 
gloves to avoid finger prints on the weapons 
used in the crime was one of the simple yet 
effective techniques. In a similar way, the 
wrongdoers have implored the concept of anti-
forensic techniques to cover their digital foot 
prints. The term “anti-forensics” therefore 
refer to a combination of software tools and 
techniques designed to impede the digital 
investigation and to make it difficult for a 
forensic examiner to find or locate data, or to 
make potential evidence inadmissible in the 
court of law (Ispirian, 2013). 
2.4.1   Anti-Forensic Methods 
There are four main methods to perform anti-
forensics namely, data contraception, data 
hiding, data destruction and data misdirection 
(Bilby, 2006). 
1. Data Contraception: prevents the 
potential evidence from existing 
somewhere on the phones memory 
where it can be analyzed. For 
example, using a memory only 
malware to force execution on just a 
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certain part of the phone’s main 
memory. 
2. Data Hiding: In this case, potential 
evidence data is put on the disk 
somewhere unlikely for the forensic 
tools to locate. For example, placing a 
picture in the root directory of a 
rooted/jail broken MD, as the forensic 
tools may go to the default picture 
related folders to extract them as 
evidence. 
3. Data Destruction: involves destroying 
any evidence before a forensics activity 
(such as wiping the memory by a 
special application). It may be used to 
manipulate the potential data stored 
in the phone memory according to a 
set of user specified instructions, such 
as slowing down the connectivity to 
the forensic tool and then deleting 
potential evidence data before allowing 
the tool to start extraction. 
4. Data Misdirection: provides the 
forensic tools with false data that is 
indistinguishable from the real thing. 
For example, changing a .pdf file to an 
.exe file and thus making it look like 
an executable. 
It is really hard to extract any useful 
information after data destruction. In this 
case finding unique patterns in the memory or 
the artifacts related to a data destruction tool 
are usually enough to convict an individual 
for spoliation. Similarly, data contraception is 
related to physical memory or RAM analysis 
so out of the scope of this work and the 
proposed framework. Therefore, the remaining 
two methods (data hiding and data 
misdirection) were used in creating and 
testing the proposed framework.  
3. MOS1 TESTING 
FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE 
DEVICE FORENSICS 
The basic aim of the framework is the 
evaluation of MDFTs with emphasis on anti-
                                                     
1 Maxwell, Oliver and Shahzad 
forensics and quantification of the term 
“support”. In addition, it provides some level 
of quality assurance for the performance of 
the tool with respect to a specific profile. 
Quality assurance is defined as “a planned and 
systematic pattern of all the actions which are 
necessary to provide adequate confidence that 
an item or a product conforms to established 
technical requirements.” (Radatz, Geraci, & 
Katki, 1990) 
The framework is based on the Carrier’s 
attribute list (Carrier, 2003). The list outlines 
the following major attributes that a digital 
forensic tool must possess: 
1. Usability: is the ability of a tool to 
present evidence in accurate and 
unambiguous format so as to prevent 
misinterpretation. 
2. Comprehensive: is the ability of a tool 
to present all the forms of extracted 
evidence inclusive of exculpatory and 
inculpatory evidence. 
3. Accuracy: is the ability of a tool to 
present extracted evidence accurately 
with a known margin of error to 
ensure the correctness of the results. 
4. Deterministic: is the ability of a tool 
to produce consistent results. 
5. Verifiable: is the ability of a tool to 
ensure accuracy of the results either 
via using an independent tool or 
manual means. 
MOS framework actually extends the test 
plan from NIST by including assertions and 
test actions to cover anti-forensics as well. 
The section below will only discuss the new 
profiles introduced by our framework. The 
ones not discussed must be treated in 
accordance to the original NIST test plan 
(National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), 2010b).  
3.1 Personal Information Management 
(PIM)  
Assertion MOS-AO-01: If a cellular forensic 
tool completes acquisition of the target device 
without error then address book entries shall 
be presented in a useable format even if some 
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fields are manipulated with data hiding or 
misdirecting intentions. 
Assertion MOS-AO-02: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without any error then 
datebook, calendar and note entries shall be 
presented in a useable format, even if the 
associated data is hidden or misdirected by 
setting wrong date and time stamps. 
Test Action: Populate integer fields and 
leave character fields empty. 
Test Action: Populate character fields and 
leave integer fields empty. 
Test Action: Set calendar entries to “x” 
years later or earlier. Whereas x = 1,2,3… 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired PIM 
data matches known PIM data for all test 
cases. 
3.2 Call Logs 
Assertion MOS-AO-03: If a cellular forensic 
tool completes acquisition of a target device 
without error then the corresponding 
date/timestamps and the duration of the call 
shall be presented in a useable format and it 
should be reported in UTC to counter any 
impact of the change in the time zone. 
Test Action: Populate the internal 
memory with incoming calls 
Test Action: Populate the internal 
memory with missed calls 
Test Action: Populate the internal 
memory with outgoing calls 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired call log 
data matches known call log data, acquired 
timestamp is reported in UTC for all calls and 
all the fields/attributes are duly reported. 
3.3 Text Messages (EMS, SMS, MMS and 
Third Party Applications) 
Class of text messages shall not be confined to 
the messages originating from the native 
applications in the form of EMS, SMS and 
MMS only, but artifacts associated with all 
the sorts of text messaging applications 
should be included (for instance, Skype, 
Viber, Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook). Hence 
all the instances of EMS, SMS and MMS in 
all the appropriate core and optional 
assertions must be replaced, tested and 
evaluated against this generic class of 
messages. 
Assertion MOS-AO-04: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then text messages 
not only from the default location but from 
any possible location shall be presented in a 
useable format to counter any data hiding 
attempts.  
Assertion MOS-AO-05: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then the 
corresponding date/time stamps for text 
messages shall be presented in useable format 
and reported in UTC to counter any impact 
of the change in time zone. 
Assertion MOS-AO-06: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then text messages 
even if locked shall be presented in a useable 
format to counter any data hiding attempts. 
Test Action: If MD has the capability, 
then create a new folder and move messages 
to the newly created folder. 
Test Action: Change the time zone of the 
device before beginning data population. 
Test Action: If MD has lock feature, 
activate the lock on all the possible messages. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired text 
messages match known text messages, 
timestamps are reported in UTC/Device and 
all entries from all the locations and all the 
fields duly reported. 
3.4 Stand-alone Multi-media Data (Audio, 
Video and Graphics) 
Assertion MOS-AO-07: If a cellular forensic 
tool completes acquisition of the target device 
without error then stand-alone multi-media 
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files both from default and any other location 
shall be presented in a useable format. 
Test Action: Populate data into the 
default folder. 
Test Action: If the device has capability, 
create a new folder and move files into the 
newly created folder 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multi-
media matches known multi-media data for 
both test cases. 
Assertion MOS-AO-08: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then stand-alone 
multi-media files with missing header/footer 
shall be presented in a useable format. 
Test Action: Populate the MD with multi-
media files having headers and or footers 
modified. Hex Editor by NEO was used to 
modify the headers and footers of different 
files. 
Test Action: Relocate files to a non-
default location.  
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multi-
media data matches the known multi-media 
data for both cases and the status of the data 
reported as tempered or corrupted2. 
Assertion MOS-AO-09: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then stand-alone 
multi-media files with missing/modified 
extensions shall be presented in a useable 
format. 
Test Action: Populate the device default 
location with files having file extensions 
modified. 
Test Action: Relocate the files to non-
default location. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multi-
media data matches the known multi-media 
data for both cases and the tool reports the 
exact file type. 
                                                     
2 Corrupted in the sense of header/footer or 
extension(s) 
Assertion MOS-AO-10: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then stand-alone 
multi-media files which are corrupted shall be 
presented as corrupted. 
Test Action: Populate the device default 
location with corrupted files. 
Test Action: Relocate corrupted files to 
non-default locations. 
Conformance Indicator: The acquired 
multi-media data matches the known multi-
media data and the device also reports that 
the file has been tampered or corrupted. 
Assertion MOS-AO-11: If a cellular 
forensic tool provides support for multi-media 
files of the target device then the tool shall 
successfully acquire large data from the target 
device without error. 
Test Action: Populate device default 
location with large multi-media files. 
Test Action: Relocate large multi-media 
files to non-default locations. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired multi-
media data matches the known multi-media 
data and the extraction does not terminate 
prematurely. 
3.5 Application Data 
Application data means data in the form of 
text documents, spreadsheet, power-points, 
pdf and other document formats. 
Assertion MOS-AO-12: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes acquisition of the 
target device without error then application 
data files both from default and any other 
location shall be presented in a useable 
format. 
Test Action: Populate device data into the 
default folders. 
Test Action: If the device has capability, 
create a new folder and move files into the 
newly created folder 
Testing Framework for Mobile Device … JDFSL V9N2 
© 2014 ADFSL  Page 229 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired 
application data matches the known 
application data for both the test cases. 
Assertion MOS-AO-13: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the 
target device without error then application 
data files with missing header/footer shall be 
presented in a useable format. 
Test Action: Populate the device default 
location with files having header and footer 
modified. 
Test Action: Relocate files to non-default 
locations. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired 
application data matches the known 
application data for both the cases and the 
data are reported as tempered corrupted. 
Assertion MOS-AO-14: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the 
target device without error then application 
data files with missing/modified extensions 
shall be presented in a useable format. 
Test Action: Populate device default 
location with files having file extensions 
modified. 
Test Action: Relocate files to non-default 
location. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired 
application data matches the known 
application data for both cases.  
Assertion MOS-AO-15: If a cellular 
forensic tool provides support for application 
data files of the target device then the tool 
shall successfully acquire large data files from 
the target device without any error. 
Test Action: Populate device default 
locations with large files. 
Test Action: Relocate these files to non-
default locations. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired 
application data matches the known 
application data. Extraction does not 
terminate prematurely. 
Assertion MOS-AO-16: If a cellular 
forensic tool completes the acquisition of the 
target device without an error then 
application data files which are corrupted 
shall be presented as corrupted. 
Test Action: Populate device default 
locations with corrupted files. 
Test Action: Relocate corrupted files to 
non-default locations. 
Conformance Indicator: Acquired 
application data matches the known 
application data and the tool reports that the 
file has been tampered with or corrupted. 
4.  EVALUATING MOS 
TESTING FRAMEWORK 
The framework was evaluated by testing the 
aforementioned tools via experimentation 
(Ayers, 2007). The results were documented 
and a method to quantify the level of the 
term “support” was also introduced. 
Each tool was tested against all the test 
assertions including seventy six (76) from 
NIST test plan and sixteen (16) from MOS 
framework.  For each assertion the tool was 
awarded a number from 0, 1 or 2 depending 
on the following criteria. 
a) 2 – Obtained results conform to the 
expected results. It means that the 
data was found and duly reported  
b) 1 – Obtained results were rather closer 
to the expected results, which mean 
that the assertion was on borderline 
(neither passed nor failed). 
c) 0 – Obtained results did not conform 
to the expected results or not found. 
Then the tool was assigned grades for each 
of the twenty profiles using equation (1) and 
equation (2). The grades can help quantify 
the term support for each profile. Grading 
was done for NIST assertions alone (Equation 
1), MOS assertions alone (Equation 1) and 
the combination of NIST and MOS assertions 
(Equation 2). The framework increased the 
resolution of quantification levels for the term 
support to suit the requirements of an 
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investigator and give him an opportunity to 
select the appropriate tool for his/her needs.  
Table 1 Grading Scale 
Support Level Percentage Score
A1 – A10 91 -100 
B1 – B10 81 - 90 
C1 – C10 71-80 
D1 – D10 61-70 
E1 – E10 51-60 
F score ≤ 50 
score = (p ÷ n) × 100 (1)
scorecombined = (2 × CA + AO) ÷ 3 (2)
Whereas, p = total points obtained for a 
specific profile and n = total number points 
for that specific profile. Each assertion can 
give a maximum of two (2) points and a tool 
can obtain any discrete point from zero (0) to 
two (2) depending on the test results. 
scorecombined represents the combined score of 
both compulsory assertions (CA) and optional 
assertions (AO) for a profile. CA were given 
double the importance than AO while 
calculating scorecombined (Equation 2). Grading 
is done following the scale in Table 1. 
5. RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
Table 2 represents the evaluation results of 
our framework. Two tools “X” and “U” were 
tested for all the new sixteen assertions in 
MOS and seventy six assertions in NIST using 
two MDs (Samsung Galaxy S4 Gt-i9505 and 
iPhone 4 A1332). The results of all these 
assertions were used to get the grades for each 
profile. There are six grades (A to F) and 
each grade has then ten steps within (1 to 10) 
to increase the resolution. It has a potential to 
precisely quantify the level of support for each 
tool in a given profile. 
Table 2 represents the evaluation results 
in three forms. It has the evaluation results 
against the new assertions introduced in MOS 
only (using Equation 1), assertions in NIST 
only (using Equation 1) and all the assertions 
in NIST and MOS combined (using Equation 
2). It can help quantify the level of support 
for anti-forensics only, NIST only and 
combined depending on the requirements of 
the case being investigated. Table 2 shows 
that tool “X” scores better grades for most of 
the profiles in MOS only, NIST only and 
MOS+NIST. 
 
Table 2 Evaluation Results 
 Support Level MOS NIST MOS+NIST 
  X U X U X U 
 Connectivity (between the tool and the MD)   E6 D7 E6 D7 
D
ata A
cquisition and 
Interpretation
--Presentation   A10 A10 A10 A10 
--Subscriber and Equipment Related Data   A10 D7 A10 D7 
--Personal Information Management (PIM) 
Data 
A10 F C5 C5 C8 D9 
--Call Logs A10 A10 A10 A2 A10 A4 
--Text Messages A10 A10 A4 B7 A6 B10 
--Stand-alone Multi-media Data C10 F A10 A10 A3 C10 
--Application Data D3 F F A10 E4 C5 
--Internet Related Data   A10 A10 A10 A10 
 Location Related Data   A10 A10 A10 A10 
 Tool Acquisition Variations    C8 C8 C8 C8 
 Device Data Not Modified    A10 A10 A10 A10 
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 Generated Reports / Preview-Pane   A10 A10 A10 A10 
 Case File/Data Protection   F F F F 
 SIM PIN/PUK Authentication    A10 D7 A10 D7 
 Physical Acquisition   F D7 F D7 
 Non-ASCII Character Presentation   A10 F A10 F 
 Stand-alone Acquisition    A10 A10 A10 A10 
 Hashing   F F F F 
 GPS Reporting   A10 A10 A10 A10 
 
Table 3 Individual scores for each assertion in NIST and MOS 
Assertion X U Assertion X U Assertion X U 
SPT-CA-01 2 2 SPT-CA-32 2 2 SPT-OA-31 2 2 
SPT-CA-02 0 0 SPT-OA-01 2 2 SPT-OA-32 1 2 
SPT-CA-03 1 2 SPT-OA-02 0 0 SPT-OA-33 0 1 
SPT-CA-04 2 2 SPT-OA-03 2 2 SPT-OA-34 1 1 
SPT-CA-05 2 0 SPT-OA-04 2 2 SPT-OA-35 1 1 
SPT-CA-06 2 2 SPT-OA-05 2 2 SPT-OA-36 1 1 
SPT-CA-07 2 1 SPT-OA-06 2 2 SPT-OA-37 1 1 
SPT-CA-08 2 2 SPT-OA-07 2 2 SPT-OA-38 1 2 
SPT-CA-09 2 1 SPT-OA-08 2 2 SPT-OA-39 1 1 
SPT-CA-10 0 0 SPT-OA-09 2 2 SPT-OA-40 2 1 
SPT-CA-11 0 2 SPT-OA-10 2 1 SPT-OA-41 2 1 
SPT-CA-12 2 2 SPT-OA-11 0 0 SPT-OA-42 2 2 
SPT-CA-13 2 2 SPT-OA-12 2 2 SPT-OA-43 0 0 
SPT-CA-14 2 2 SPT-OA-13 2 1 SPT-OA-44 2 2 
SPT-CA-15 2 2 SPT-OA-14 2 2 MOS-AO-01 2 1 
SPT-CA-16 2 2 SPT-OA-15 2 2 MOS-AO-02 2 1 
SPT-CA-17 2 2 SPT-OA-16 2 1 MOS-AO-03 2 2 
SPT-CA-18 2 2 SPT-OA-17 2 2 MOS-AO-04 2 2 
SPT-CA-19 2 2 SPT-OA-18 2 2 MOS-AO-05 2 2 
SPT-CA-20 2 1 SPT-OA-19 0 0 MOS-AO-06 2 2 
SPT-CA-21 2 2 SPT-OA-20 2 2 MOS-AO-07 2 2 
SPT-CA-22 2 2 SPT-OA-21 2 2 MOS-AO-08 2 2 
SPT-CA-23 2 2 SPT-OA-22 2 2 MOS-AO-09 2 0 
SPT-CA-24 2 2 SPT-OA-23 0 0 MOS-AO-10 0 0 
SPT-CA-25 2 2 SPT-OA-24 0 0 MOS-AO-11 2 0 
SPT-CA-26 2 2 SPT-OA-25 2 2 MOS-AO-12 2 2 
SPT-CA-27 1 2 SPT-OA-26 2 2 MOS-AO-13 1 2 
SPT-CA-28 2 2 SPT-OA-27 0 0 MOS-AO-14 2 0 
SPT-CA-29 2 2 SPT-OA-28 2 2 MOS-AO-15 2 0 
SPT-CA-30 2 2 SPT-OA-29 2 1 MOS-AO-16 0 0 
SPT-CA-31 2 2 SPT-OA-30 2 1    
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Table 3 carries the raw results in the form of 
assertions with their obtained marks for both 
“X” and “U” tools. These were used in 
equation (1), equation (2) to calculate the 
combined scores. Combined scores were used 
in the light of the scale (Table 1) to calculate 
the grades representing the level of support 
for each profile. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The increasing capabilities of the mobile 
devices, as well as the ongoing changes in the 
communication and computing paradigms, in 
addition to global wide-spread usage and 
many benefits in the professional and private 
activities to their users, has also opened up 
many opportunities for their abuse in 
unwanted deeds and actions including the use 
of anti-forensics techniques to avoid detection 
while being investigated. Moreover, the 
sophistication of the users and available 
applications makes it much easier to exploit 
various anti-forensics techniques in order to 
hinder prospective digital investigations. In 
order to address these challenges, it was 
required to extend the NIST smartphone test 
plan with an emphasis to counter any 
potential anti-forensics attempts. The novel 
testing framework, based on the existing 
NIST criteria and MOS extension can 
evaluate a MDFT while taking care of the use 
of potential anti-forensics techniques as well. 
As of today, we have found that the term 
“supported” with respect to MDFT is also 
subjective. Quantification of the term 
“support” is another advantage of using the 
MOS framework, as an extension of the NIST 
one from 2010.  The framework introduces a 
standard to define and then tag the term 
support to a MDFT.  
The resolution of the level of support is 
also quite high; hence it can potentially 
quantify the level of support with fairly high 
precision. Consequently, it can help an 
investigator to select the tool with an 
unambiguously defined support level for a 
particular profile. A better choice of the tool 
can result in saving time and effort required 
to perform a digital investigation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is an 
innovative way of looking into the problem of 
MDFT evaluation. Currently, we have only 
introduced sixteen new assertions in only five 
profiles. To make the framework more robust, 
encompassing, and to a certain degree more 
general, we will explore and extend more 
areas (profiles) where anti-forensics techniques 
can potentially be employed. 
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